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Collective labor relations and juridification: A marriage proposal 
 
Assaf S. Bondy1 and Jonathan Preminger2 
 
Abstract  
Contributing to debates over relations between the collective and juridified regulation of labor, 
this article analyzes a rich case study in the Israeli construction sector to claim that 
juridification can spur unions and employers’ associations to initiate strategic and inclusive 
change. By subsuming processes of juridification into traditional IR frameworks and 
embracing its logic and practices, the corporatist social partners broaden the relevance of 
collective labor relations to workers otherwise excluded from direct union representation. In 
this way, while not increasing union density or improving wages, thee ‘traditional’ IR actors 
reassert their monopolistic control over worker and employer representation, as well as over 
the sectoral labor market. 
 




The juridification of industrial relations (IR), and the rising significance of individual 
employment rights from 1960s onwards, are increasingly the subject of IR research (e.g. Clark, 
1985; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013; Heery 2011). While much trade union research 
still focuses on declining union fortunes and efforts at revitalization (e.g. Frege and Kelly, 
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2003; Ibsen and Tapia, 2017), the relationship between this increasingly dominant 
‘employment rights regime’ (Colvin, 2016) and the vestigial institutions of collective labor 
relations has been less widely studied (Piore and Safford, 2006). Nonetheless, a growing body 
of scholarship suggests that juridification and the rise of employment rights regime are linked 
to the decline of collective labor relations: the increase in individualized dispute resolution, the 
growing importance of workplace- or organization-level regulation of the employment 
relationship, and the rise of ‘new IR actors’ (Colvin, 2016; Currie and Teague, 2016; Heery 
and Frege, 2006; Heery, Williams and Abbott, 2012; O’Sullivan et al., 2015). These 
developments have been found to undermine the dominance and control of both unions and 
employers’ associations (EAs) in the representation of their constituencies and the regulation 
of labor (Mundlak 2009). On the other hand, research has shown that the same processes may 
extend statutory protection to workers who had not formerly benefited from unionism (Colling, 
2004; Fine, 2009; Larsen and Mailand, 2018). 
We contribute to this body of research by investigating the implications of increasing 
juridification for collective labor relations, specifically the relationship between the rise of the 
‘employment rights regime’ (Colvin, 2016) and ‘traditional’ collective IR in the context of a 
robust corporatist institutional legacy. We use ‘juridification’ to mean ‘the process of 
establishing mandatory legal norms that substitute for extra-legal regulation of social or 
economic relationships’ (Mundlak, 2007: 154), and ask – how do these processes of 
juridification impact the structures and frameworks of collective industrial relations? We 
therefore respond to Colvin’s (2016: 26) call for industrial relations research to ‘more fully 
address the issues and implications posed by the rise of the individual employment rights era 
in employment relations’, and the relative paucity of research into initiatives which address the 
employment relationship of ‘atypical’ workers through sectoral social dialogue (Larsen and 
Mailand, 2018; Simms, 2017).  
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Focusing on sector-level IR, we also respond to calls for greater attention to meso-level 
institutions (e.g. Bechter et al., 2012; Bondy, 2018, 2020a, 2020b). Heeding Guillaume (2018: 
239), who argues for a ‘nuanced and contextualized approach to the juridification of 
employment relations’, we present a precedential development in the sectoral IR of the Israeli 
construction industry – the establishment of an ‘enforcement committee’ under the auspices of 
the traditional social partners (the union and the EA), to address recurrent grievances of 
noncitizen Palestinian workers. Based on this rich case study, the article analyzes the ways 
social partners take advantage of the juridification of IR; we thus adopt an actor-centered 
approach, which suggests that ‘entrepreneurial actors, working within existing sets of 
institutions, engage in various forms of incremental change… [that] can become, over time, 
transformational’ (Howell and Givan, 2011: 234).  
The article demonstrates how a strategic development by the traditional social partners 
in response to increased juridification enhanced their legitimacy and control, subjugating 
processes of juridification to collective IR frameworks and promoting (partially) inclusive 
interest representation. The article suggests, then, that in certain contexts the legal and judicial 
branches can serve as drivers for inclusive changes in collective bargaining, shoring up the 
legitimacy of the union and of the social partnership.1 While it may not (immediately) increase 
union density or improve wages and working conditions, the strategy can nonetheless 
strengthen the social partners’ domination and broaden the relevance of collective labor 
relations to workers otherwise excluded from direct union representation. In short, given a 
context of juridification and the declining legitimacy of sectoral collective bargaining, strategic 
change that embraces the logic of legal enforcement can enable the social partners to reassert 
their monopolistic control over worker and employer representation, previously undermined 
by external judicial interventions, as well as over the sectoral labor market, contributing to the 
revival of coordinated IR.  
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In the first section below, current research into juridification and its implications on 
collective labor relations is reviewed, noting the special position of social partnership within 
the context of corporatist IR. The research methodology is then presented, followed by an 
overview of IR in Israel’s construction sector, and an analysis of transformations in the 
enforcement of construction workers’ rights, concluding with the establishment of an 
innovative ‘enforcement committee.’ There then follows a discussion and a conclusion which 
highlights the main findings and theoretical contributions. While the case demonstrates how 
the social partners’ control is challenged and undermined by juridification, our analysis shows 
how, in responding to this challenge, the social partners adopt its logic and practices into 
traditional collective labor relations, thus augmenting their dominance. This article, then, 
contributes to our understanding of the potential benefits of juridification to collective labor 
relations through its capacity to spur the renewal of coordinated IR and broaden its reach to 
include formerly excluded workers. In particular, it underlines the circumstances under which 
collective labor relations can work with juridified norms, as an inclusive strategy, promoting 
increased representativeness and bargaining coordination. Indeed, it is precisely the challenge 
posed by juridification to cross-class collaboration that spurred social partnership reform. The 
article thus increases our understanding of the relationship between juridified processes and 




The juridification of labor relations and workers’ rights has been noted in both decentralized 
and corporatist industrial relations systems as central state regulations gradually substitute for 
collectively bargained norms (Cioffi, 2009; Clark, 1985; Colling, 2004; Colvin 2016; Heery, 
2011; Howell and Givan, 2011; Mundlak, 2007; Piore and Safford, 2006; Simitis, 1987; Visser, 
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2005), including in countries beyond Europe and the Anglo-US world with various 
employment relations legacies (e.g. Benson, 2012; Saini, 1991). This trend is manifested in the 
increasing importance of lobbying and litigation to address workers’ grievances and enforce 
rights, at the expense of traditional paths to worker representation (Ibsen and Tapia, 2017; 
Gooberman et al., 2018). In the US and UK for example, there has been a marked rise in the 
number of cases brought before the employment tribunals (Guillaume, 2018; Schneider, 2001), 
reflecting the increasing significance of employment rights and of judicial means of enforcing 
them.2 Even in ‘classic’ examples of corporatist labor relations, we see decentralization and 
shrinking collective agreement coverage (e.g. Doellgast and Greer, 2007), with a corresponding 
increase in the use of labor courts to settle individual disputes. 
However, juridification means different things to decentralized or liberal collective 
labor relations such as those in Anglo-American economies, and corporatist collective labor 
relations. For the former, juridification first involved the creation of a statutory basis for 
employment rights. Statutory minimal rights and their enforcement by state agencies (including 
by the courts) can be understood as the ‘nationalization’ of employment relationship regulation. 
Initially, the state shoulders the burden of increased cost, which in some countries has led to 
state efforts ‘to privatize the costs and procedures’, pushing responsibility ‘back onto the 
parties [to the dispute] and into workplaces but without the democratic and collective elements 
of socialized systems’ (Colling, 2004: 571-2). Thus ‘nationalization’ was followed by the 
‘privatization’ of representation through law offices and non-union organizations (Heery, 
2011; Colling, 2004), ‘pushing [dispute resolution] processes back down into the workplaces 
and restricting the circumstances in which disputes might be brought into the public arena’ 
(Colling, 2004: 566).  
For corporatist systems, in addition to the statutory basis, juridification also means the 
increasing intervention of the courts in processes of collective bargaining or collective labor 
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disputes (Mundlak and Harpaz, 2002). From maintaining frameworks to support the social 
partners in regulating the employment relationship collectively, courts moved to increase their 
oversight of formerly autonomous IR spheres (Mundlak, 2007). Thus, while dispute resolution 
mechanisms have become increasingly individualized in decentralized IR systems (see Colvin, 
2016), in corporatist systems they remain strongly under the (often coordinated) control of 
social partners (see Ibsen 2019).  
Juridification has been positioned counter to collective labor relations (e.g. O’Sullivan 
et al., 2015), and for good reason. Juridification challenges ‘traditional’ IR as it increases 
bargaining decentralization by reducing the incentives for social partners to engage in 
collective bargaining – undermining flexible regulation and impinging on the autonomy of 
collective actors (Howell, 2005; Mundlak, 2007). It encourages the growth of procedures over 
which workers have little control, and into the creation and operation of which they have little 
input, making workers less involved in determining the conditions of their own employment. 
While legal strategies were seen as key to organizing in some decentralized IR systems (e.g. 
Narro, 2009), the rights-based employment legislation on which they relied ‘may compromise 
[the] monopoly power of trade union representation since it creates a process whereby people 
interact with matters relating to work… as legal subjects and not as members of a trade union’ 
(Currie and Teague 2016: 366). In contexts of centralized collective regulation, this risk is far 
greater, threatening the autonomy of collective labor relations i  determining labor standards 
and regulating the employment relationship. This form of juridified regulation, enacted and 
enforced by state agencies and the judicial system, undermines the previous dominance of 
unions and EAs (Mundlak, 2009).  
With growing substitution of collective agreements by legislation, and new forms of 
judicial representation displacing traditional collective representation (Mundlak 2007), 
traditional IR actors (unions and EAs) gradually lose their favored position in workers’ 
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representation, and new actors and judicial procedures gain prominence in both class 
representation and labor regulation (Heery and Frege, 2006; Heery, Williams and Abbott, 
2012). In some IR systems, traditional actors adopt new strategies to include precarious 
workers, previously excluded from union representation, and in this way push back against 
juridification trends (Arnholtz, 2019). However, in other systems, unions fail to tackle these 
changes or to develop inclusive solidarity with precarious workers (e.g. Larsen and Mailand, 
2018), thus leaving the way clear for further juridification and to the increasing involvement 
of ‘new’, non-union IR actors.   
By increasing courts’ intervention in previously autonomous spheres of collective 
regulation – through review of collective agreements, issuing injunctions against strikes and 
increasing litigation on previously negotiated norms – juridification has granted significant 
power to these non-union actors (Heery, Abbott, & Williams, 2012; Mundlak, 2009). Lacking 
recognized or otherwise ‘special’ status in the labor market, these actors, such as CSOs and 
‘entrepreneurial’ lawyers, rely on legal strategies to advance the (perceived) interest of their 
constituencies. In many cases, they act independently to represent workers that were previously 
excluded from traditional union representation, focusing on the representation of migrant 
workers, women and those in precarious employment (e.g. Fine, 2009). In these cases, such 
actors promote individual workers’ representation and rights, focusing on the enforcement of 
labor rights in sectors characterized by high violation rates and bringing the voice and interests 
of workers into arenas from which they had been excluded (Fine and Bartley, 2019).
Unsurprisingly, then, research suggests that non-unionized workers are more likely than their 
union counterparts to benefit from judicialized forms of dispute resolution (e.g. Colling 2004: 
557), further emphasizing the line between the employment rights regime and collective labor 
relations, as well as between unions and new IR actors (e.g. Fine, 2009).  
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However, there is some research suggesting that the two spheres and logics of action 
are not incompatible. While new actors are seen to develop independent judicial representation 
for precarious workers, in some cases they are also found to cooperate with unions to promote 
joint political-economic goals (Alberti, 2016; Heery, Williams and Abbott, 2012; O’Sullivan 
et al., 2015). In contexts of decentralized IR systems, cooperation among unions and non-union 
actors can increase the inclusive nature of unions and their embeddedness in local communities 
(Narro, 2008, 2009). Moreover, unions themselves are playing an increasing role in 
representing individual employment rights, providing accessible channels for enforcing those 
rights and using new labor legislation to advance their members’ interests (Colling, 2012; 
Currie and Teague, 2016; Deakin et al., 2015; Guillaume, 2018; Heery, 2011), or investing 
resources in legal representation of workers, either directly or through legal firms (Schneider, 
2001). But union funds are limited, leaving huge numbers of cases to new IR actors, who 
provide services to increasing numbers of workers. Unions are not alone in facing resource 
shortages: Juridification can be costly for employers too, who face expensive and time-
consuming claims (Guillaume, 2018; Colvin, 2016: 19) while labor courts or tribunals can 
become inundated with cases (e.g. Colling, 2004: 556). Nonetheless, it is the very existence of 
such legislation encroaching on union territory that poses a challenge to the collective 
underpinnings of IR (e.g. Holgate, 2009), while the entrance of new actors to IR increases 
juridification trends and undermines the union’s monopolist dominance (Mundlak, 2009).  
In the face of these challenges, traditional actors may change strategy to regain their 
dominant position in labor regulation (e.g. Arnholtz, 2019). While the analysis of changing 
strategies of traditional IR has been predominantly the domain of union revitalization literature, 
we propose a broader perspective, taking into account both sides to the traditional class conflict 
and focusing on the social partnership. Such a perspective is crucial for understanding the 
dynamics of change in corporatist IR systems, where EAs are critical actors (Traxler, 2003). In 
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decentralized IR systems after the weakening of unions and decline in union density, ‘the threat 
of legal… sanctions for violation of employee rights serves to counter employer power and 
check management authority’ (Colvin, 2016: 7). However, where membership (or its decline) 
was not perceived as being crucial for maintaining collective bargaining, social partnership 
faced fewer challenges and neither unions nor EAs sought its demise (e.g. De Beer and Keune, 
2018). While the social partners faced other challenges concerning their legitimate status, 
institutionalized collaboration at sector or peak levels showed relative structural resilience 
(Hayter and Visser, 2018). Yet despite continuity in the social partners’ central roles in setting 
socioeconomic agendas in some IR systems (Dörre, 2011; Marginson, 2015; Mundlak, 2009), 
a key concern among scholars is their increasing alienation from their constituencies, and 
reduced ability to represent class interest; this directly impacts their influence on the 
employment relationship and their ability to promote socioeconomic inclusion (Doellgast et 
al., 2018; Greer and Doellgast, 2017; Visser, 2005). 
Furthermore, while IR structures may still be intact, social partnership may even 
undermine the legitimacy of the social partners in the eyes of their constituencies. This is 
because central collective regulation is seen to come at the expense of inclusiveness and to 
undermine the voice of the workers and employers, who then seek alternative representational 
forms (e.g. Benassi and Dorigatti, 2015; Heery, Abbott, and Williams, 2012; Mundlak, 2009; 
Preminger, 2013, 2018b). In short, by focusing on policymaking, social partners often 
undermine industrial democracy – limiting participation in the political process of labor market 
regulation – and thereby risk the organizational legitimacy of collective representation (Dufour 
and Hege, 2010; Mundlak, 2020), the sustainability of bargaining coordination and the social 
partners’ ability to enforce collectively-agreed norms (e.g., Baccaro, 2003; Arnholtz, 2019). 
Hence, although institutions accord relative advantage in centralized settings to cross-class 
collaborations and partnership, these too are under threat from external pressures and their 
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impact on the relations between the social partners and their constituencies. These pressures 
constitute a growing challenge to previously stable IR frameworks, eroding their capacity to 
generate gainsharing schemes and leading to increased reliance on juridified regulation and on 
new representative actors (Bondy, 2020b). In the context of a strong corporatist institutional 
legacy, then, we would expect juridification (and the consequent erosion of centralized 
collective bargaining) to spur both unions and EAs to change strategy. Such change may have 
limited ability to ‘turn back the clock’ and reverse juridification, but could nonetheless rebuild 
the dominance of the social partners through the adoption of new legal and political norms, 




The article analyses the establishment of a new enforcement mechanism in Israel’s construction 
industry. This industry is particularly suitable for investigating the issues reviewed above as it 
conforms to assertions in the literature regarding the revival of collective IR, including the 
difficulty of creating a group identity able to underwrite collective interests; the loss of the 
union’s coercive power (Simms and Charlwood, 2010); the lack of a binding ideology of 
worker solidarity (Preminger, 2018a: 105-117), and a fragmented workforce, and thus the 
difficulty of organizing workers – all characteristic of this industry. In addition, in light of 
Simms and Charlwood’s (2010: 127) observation that ‘different prescriptions for renewal 
emerge from the different analyses of the challenges facing unions’, the article clearly defines 
the challenges facing the union in the case study as the juridification of IR and the associated 
entry of new IR actors. Thus the social partners in this industry face challenges familiar to 
pluralist IR systems, but operate within an economy which still bears the characteristics of a 
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corporatist IR system (Bondy, 2020a), enabling the exploration of juridification within the 
institutional legacies of robust centralized IR. 
The article draws on archival research, analysis of collective agreements, and 
interviews. Research was conducted at the Israeli labor movement archive (the Lavon 
Institute), the Historical Jewish Press Archive at the National Library of Israel, and the Knesset 
(Israeli parliament) Archives. These archives yielded minutes from union meetings, 
correspondence about representation of construction workers, and correspondence about 
Palestinian workers’ representation between 1970 and 2015. These materials were 
complemented by content-analysis of 60 collective agreements, constituting all sector- and 
company-level collective agreements signed between 1945-2015, filed with the registrar of 
collective agreements at the Labor and Welfare Ministry. Some 50 court rulings (mainly 
individual labor disputes) were also analyzed, taken from cases at both regional labor courts 
and the National Labor Court in the years 2010-2019 (available at www.nevo.co.il).  
Fifteen semi-structured interviews of 1-1.5 hours long were conducted in 2017 and 
2018 with representatives of relevant IR actors in the Israeli construction sector. This included 
representatives from the Histadrut’s Construction and Woodworkers Union (the chair, the 
union’s representative on the enforcement committee, and a union lawyer),3 senior Histadrut 
officials, private labor lawyers, lawyers representing employers and the employers’ 
organization, representatives of the employers’ organization, and representatives of the main 
NGO acting in the sector. The material thus enables the identif ication of the main actors 
involved in establishing the enforcement mechanism, their objectives, the cooperation required 
and balance of power, and the m chanism’s reception by the labor courts. All translations from 
documents and interviews are the authors’. 
 
Employment relations in the Israeli construction sector 
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The Israeli construction sector was a leading industry in the first decades of the Israeli 
economy, based on extensive public investment and ownership, and a highly unionized 
workforce (Bondy, 2020b). By the time of the case covered here, the industry had been 
completely privatized (Grinberg and Shafir, 2000) but its legacy of corporatist governance and 
general stagnation had left collective labor relations intact. Labor regulation was therefore 
based on sectoral collective agreements, signed between the Israeli trade union federation (the 
Histadrut) and the subordinated sectoral union (the Construction and Woodworkers Union), 
and the sectoral EA, extended erga omnes to cover the entire sector and granting the social 
partners with strong institutional security (Bondy, 2020a). Despite a robust structure of 
collective representation, from the 1960s onwards, the increasing dominance of multi-level 
subcontracting and private firms using unorganized cheap labor led to the weakening of the 
social partners’ position in construction as collective bargaining was losing its former efficacy. 
While the Histadrut remained the monopolistic representative of workers in the sector, without 
a coordinated strategy of workers’ representation its dominance and effectivity were eroded.  
This process – of subcontracting, weakening social partners and the decline of workers’ 
power – went hand in hand with the gradual economic inclusion of noncitizen Palestinians who 
became the dominant group of non-professional workers in the construction sector (Farsakh, 
2005): by 1980, just a decade or so after their entrance into the Israeli labor market, noncitizen 
Palestinian workers in the construction sector constituted some 40% of the workforce.4 After a 
period of exclusion in the 1990s and early 2000s, their numbers rose again to the current rate 
of 25-30% of the sectoral labor force (Bondy, 2020b). Though included in the Israeli labor 
market, noncitizen Palestinian workers benefited from few protections even when formally 
covered by sectoral collective agreements (Niezna, 2018), and were subject to various 
exclusions and limitations. The exclusive nature of Palestinian workers’ representation, 
together with the low levels of coordination in sectoral representation, led to the poor 
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enforcement of labor rights, despite a unique governmental arrangement whereby Palestinians 
were not paid directly by their employers but via a governmental ‘Payments Division’, which 
was also tasked with enforcing workers’ rights (Mundlak, 2003). This governmental 
enforcement arrangement was characterized by insufficient resources and internalized racism 
(Shalev, 2017), and as the Histadrut refrained from organizing and representing noncitizen 
workers, Palestinians were d  facto excluded from ‘normal’ employment relations. This latter 
factor further perpetuated recurrent violations of workers’ rights (Bondy, 2020b; Niezna, 
2018), which the Histadrut – given its institutional security that reproduced its representative 
status – had no incentive to address. 
In the face of the Histadrut’s inaction concerning noncitizen Palestinian workers’ rights 
in the construction sector, it was civil society organizations (CSOs), seeking both labor and 
ethno-national justice, that opened the way for noncitizen Palestinians to bring their grievances 
to the labor courts (Preminger, 2017), making CSOs’ activity a major driving force in 
regulating and enforcing precarious workers’ rights (Bondy, 2020b; Mundlak, 2007). Kav 
La’Oved (‘the workers’ hotline,’ established 1991), followed by other CSOs such as HaMoked 
LePlitim VeMehagrim (‘the center for refugees and migrants’), pioneered IR juridification 
through judicial representation of noncitizen Palestinian workers and the expansion of their 
(access to) human and labor rights (see Preminger 2017). Nonetheless, following their success 
they were gradually displaced by private lawyers who expanded the scope of private litigation. 
The limited capacity of these CSOs together with continuous violations of workers’ rights 
allowed such private lawyers to develop a successful entrepreneurship in the sector, as one 
lawyer described:  
[Noncitizen] Palestinians are about 80% of my practice… [We are] several 
lawyers, some in the north, some in the center and a few in the south [of 
Israel] that specialize in [the rights of noncitizen Palestinian workers]… I 
take on approximately 2,000 cases each year, but when I can’t take a case, 
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or it is far from where I normally work, I pass it on to one of my colleagues… 
(A M, labor lawyer, interview).  
 Increasing the access of precarious construction workers to the labor courts amplified 
the numbers of cases against employers to ome 9,000 cases per year, most of them filed by 
noncitizen Palestinian workers (I M, chair of the Construction and Woodworkers Union, 
interview). As the government paid little attention to workers’ rights and the Histadrut did little 
to enforce collective agreements, the workers benefited from the initiatives of these new IR 
actors, who were able to claw back unpaid wages amounting to millions.5 Furthermore, while 
the labor courts (partially) reformed the enforcement of the collective agreements and of 
workers’ rights in the sector, its intervention burdened employers with the costs of increased 
payments to workers as well as the costs of legal representation and further undermined the 
monopolistic representative role of the Histadrut. The chair of the Construction and 
Woodworkers Union expressed his anger toward these new actors, emphasizing their economic 
motives and the ‘exploitative’ industry that had developed around the enforcement of 
noncitizen Palestinian workers’ rights: 
Workers get accompanied by lawyers… who wait for them at checkpoints 
each morning… For extremely high fees [a percentage of gains] they accept 
any case, filing hundreds of claims. They don’t care if it’s a strong case or 
not. They exploit them… (I M, chair of the Construction and Woodworkers 
Union, interview).  
While he condemned the activities of labor lawyers in the sector, he failed to explain the 
reasons for their thriving, expressing resentment mainly against the erosion of the Histadrut’s 
position in the sectoral labor relations by the increased juridification.  
 
Regaining control  
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This situation, of increasing representation of workers and enforcement of labor rights outside 
the traditional IR system, posed a serious threat to the Histadrut’s institutional security and to 
the exclusiveness of the social partnership. Finding their dominance and autonomy encumbered 
by court intervention, the social partners took steps to restore it through a new sectoral 
collective agreement that sought to restrict workers’ (independent) access to the labor courts 
by imposing arbitration in labor disputes. Signed in 2010, this agreement aimed to facilitate the 
enforcement of workers’ rights, reducing the legal burden for employers and workers while 
reinforcing the social partners’ control in the sectoral labor market and IR. This was done 
through the introduction of an innovation intended to shore up exclusive union representation: 
the social partners created a mechanism that channeled workers’ grievances towards obligatory 
arbitration by the social partners, which was meant to function as a substitute to independent 
access to legal justice – displacing external legal scrutiny with internal inspection and 
enforcement:  
In order to settle disputes… between the parties [to this agreement] or 
individuals there will be a parity committee comprised of three stages: first the 
disputed issue will be raised before a regional parity committee… If the 
regional parity committee fails to reach a conclusion within 14 days, the 
disputed issue will be raised before a national parity committee… If the 
national parity committee fails to reach a conclusion within 14 days: the 
parties will bring the disputed issue to the labor court (sectoral collective 
agreement in the construction sector, 2010. No. 7009/2 10).  
Yet, after many years of being neglected, Palestinian workers had little incentive to 
engage with the Histadrut or trust the internal mechanisms of the sectoral labor relations, and 
continued to undermine the social partners’ efforts to counter juridification. Moreover, in the 
face of recurring legal cases, the labor courts refused to ratify the internal arbitration 
mechanism as an obligatory substitute for judicial deliberation, fearing it might impinge on the 
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primary democratic principle of access to justice. According to the HR manager of the sectoral 
employers’ association, this agreement ‘was found to violate some [of the workers’] basic 
human rights…’ (I G, interview). Nonetheless, despite the labor courts’ refusal to ratify the 
obligatory arbitration mechanism, the National Labor Court recognized the social partners’ 
intentions and encouraged them to improve it: 
The parties to the sectoral collective agreement demonstrate a genuine desire 
to establish a dispute resolution mechanism, whose results are dependent on 
the agreement of all parties… We must laud this intention, but the parties to 
the sectoral collective agreement must regulate the mechanism explicitly 
within the sectoral collective agreement. (ALD 9847-04-14) 
Thus encouraged, in 2015 the social partners sought a structural solution that would not violate 
human rights (i.e. independent access to legal justice), but would grant them greater control 
over the enforcement of sectoral collective agreements and of workers’ rights.  
Following an additional round of sectoral collective bargaining, the social partners 
signed a new agreement, which included the following clause:  
The Joint Committee… will be authorized to deal with disputes between an 
employer and an employee covered by the agreement, stemming from 
subjects regulated by the agreement and by previous agreements, and which 
do not require immediate and temporary redress… The dispute will be 
discussed before the Joint Committee… prior to being deliberated in the 
authorized judicial instance – the regional labor court. (Sectoral collective 
agreement in the construction sector, 2015. No. 7020/2015, article 76) 
The 2015 collective agreement, then, accepted juridification (as well as judicial oversight and 
workers’ right to access independent legal justice), creating a semi-judicial procedure – ‘a joint 
(enforcement) committee’. Recognizing the courts’ previous critique, the social partners 
refrained from limiting workers’ access to court, but rather sought to assert their precedence 
over independent litigation in cases of individual labor disputes. Distinct from independent 
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legal procedures or third-party arbitration, the joint committee was conceived to mediate 
disputes under the control of the sectoral social partnership.  
 Aiming to legitimately substitute the labor courts in dealing with individual labor 
disputes, this semi-judicial institution assumed legal principles of fair and equal representation 
for the parties, the right to (legal) representation, and procedural and effective accessibility for 
all. Thus in stark contrast to the coerciveness of arbitration (based on the obligatory nature of 
its conclusions), the mediatory mechanism allowed the workers to reject its outcomes and 
resort to independent legal procedures. According to the sectoral collective agreement, 
interviews with the committee’s staff and internal documents of the social partners, the 
committee had a parity structure, chaired by two representatives – one from the Histadrut and 
one from the employers’ association; and both parties to the dispute had the right to 
independent representation. Furthermore, in order to strengthen its legitimacy – in the eyes of 
the workers or any external scrutiny – the committee was also responsible for issuing entry 
permits to Israel for the (noncitizen) workers; and it always had an Arabic-speaking 
representative, usually a union official, which facilitated discussions and conclusions. Finally, 
in case of disagreement with the committee’s decision, both parties were free to seek redress 
in the labor courts, as detailed in Diagram 1.  
[Diagram 1 about here] 
While this account suggests the partial displacement of judicial dispute resolution by 
subsuming it within traditional collective labor relations, conversations with labor lawyers 
revealed a more complex picture. Faced with refusal to recognize or attend mediation, the 
committee has almost no way to enforce attendance, making (legal) representation instrumental 
for the committee’s operation and (external) legitimation, as one interviewee described: 
When summoned to the committee many employers come up with various 
excuses [to not attend]… The committee doesn’t really do anything to get 
18 
 
them to come… But if there is a legal case pending or letter from a lawyer… 
the employer knows he has no choice but to attend [the committee], or else 
he’d have to go to court… In this situation… even the employer pushes [for 
getting the case heard at the committee] (M S, labor lawyer, interview). 
Thus, despite the decline in the number of independent judicial proceedings, professional labor 
lawyers and the labor courts still play an important role in the process, motivating the use of 
collective instances and even overseeing cases (see LD 48650-02-18), thereby increasing 
noncitizen workers’ trust in the system. This was noted by both workers and lawyers: 
‘[Workers] don’t trust any organization… Palestinian or Jewish… no such organization really 
helps workers’ (S H, noncitizen Palestinian construction worker, interview); ‘[noncitizen] 
Palestinian workers don’t really have confidence in the committee, nor in the [Israeli] labor 
courts, so in dealing with the authorities they almost always ask for legal counsel’ (M S, labor 
lawyer, interview).  
With its ratification by the labor courts as an obligatory instance preceding independent 
litigation (as stated in several labor court rulings; e.g. case LD 42574-01-15), the joint 
committee soon became busy, handling dozens of disputes each week. From a workload of just 
one day a week, the committee experienced a rapid workload increase and tripled its capacities 
(F B, Histadrut representative in the committee, interview). Handling such a quantity of cases, 
the committee became ‘the most important thing we [the union] do in the sector’ (I M, chair of 
the Construction and Woodworkers Union, interview). As reported by the employers’ 
association, the ratification of the committee as an obligatory precondition for judicial 
deliberation reduced formal litigation and rulings by about 90% (I G, HR manager of the 
sectoral employers’ association, interview); and while it lacked the trust of workers, these 
results expressed a boost of external legitimacy for the social partnership domination. The 
reinforcement of its legitimacy was expressed by one of the committee’s chairs: 
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Previously, workers waited two years or even more for a courts’ schedule 
and had to pay court fees etc. Now, things are going much faster… [and] 
workers are usually very content (F B, Histadrut representative in the 
committee, interview). 
The labor courts’ tight schedules and consequent delay in rulings had led many workers 
and their independent representatives to push for a pre-ruling settlement (R A, labor lawyer, 
interview). This tendency was accordingly implemented into the newly established mechanism, 
which was built on the basis of mediation, as described by a labor lawyer: ‘[We] reach very 
similar conclusions in the [enforcement] committee, but without all the mandatory procedures 
[of the labor courts]’ (O M, labor lawyer, interview). Furthermore, with labor lawyers present 
at the committee and leading the mediation process, when cases did end up in court (because 
one or both parties to the dispute refused to accept the proposed settlement), the labor courts 
frequently referred to the committee’s decision in their own verdict (e.g. case FR (JM) 50255-
04-17). When cases were referred by the court to the enforcement committee, judges gave the 
committee’s decision the status of a ruling (LD 1831-07-18); and in cases of a refusal to accept 
the committee’s decision, the court adopted the decision as a guideline during deliberations (O 
M and R A, labor lawyers, interviews). While this phenomenon reflects the basic position of 
lawyers in a legal procedure – as ‘officers of the court’ which enjoy its trust (e.g. Israeli Bar 
Law, 1961) – it also emphasizes the labor courts’ tendency to accept the autonomy of collective 
labor relations in Israeli corporatist IR (Mundlak 2007). Emphasizing the instrumental roles of 
these new IR actors in the operation or legitimacy of the enforcement committee, their 
incorporation into collective labor relations reinforces the transformation of the sectoral IR 
system – to accept juridification as an integral part of its reproduction. From interviews with 
the social partners and an analysis of legal procedures in all instances of the Israeli labor courts, 
it seems that while the enforcement committee’s workload increased steadily since it was 
20 
 
established, the number of independent legal cases brought by noncitizen Palestinian 
construction workers against their employers declined dramatically.6  
Therefore, while traditional and new IR actors serve different interests and have 
different aims, they both accept juridification and promote it: for new actors, it is the central 
strategy in their quest for justice for noncitizen workers (CSOs) and central to the norms of 
their profession (lawyers); for the traditional social partners on the other hand, juridification is 
subsumed into collective labor relations, as a means to reform effective representation and 
regain their legitimacy. Therefore, these findings suggest that juridification does not 
necessarily undermine the social partnership and the dominance of unions and EAs; rather, 
they may be able to embrace it as a strategic addition to collective labor relations. Indeed, 
juridification may even shore up the partnership, as the social partners accept its principles and 
implement them as integral part of their work. Thus, while to some extent the committee 
controls independent legalistic enforcement of employment rights, its main significance is in 
shoring up the primacy of the traditional social partnership over court deliberations, and thus 
containing the logic of juridification within collective IR.  
 
Discussion  
The case analyzed here sheds light on a number of issues raised in the literature on the 
relationship between juridification and collective IR, especially social partnership as a political 
strategy and as a key component of centralized IR systems. While most previous research 
presented collective IR and juridification as mutually antagonistic forms of regulation of the 
employment relationship (e.g. Mundlak, 2007, 2009), the article adds to recent scholarship (e.g. 
Deakin et al., 2015; Guillaume, 2018) which explores how these two regulatory approaches 
and logics might coexist: he case presented here shows social partners acting as ‘institutional 
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entrepreneurs’, who create ‘hybrids from the institutions of collective bargaining and 
substantive, individual employment law’ (Heery, 2011: 90).  
It is important to be precise about the change engendered by the social partners’ 
initiative. In keeping with other research (Kelly, 2004), the renewal of social partnership here 
shows little impact on wages and union density. Instead, facing external pressures and 
challenges to collective regulation from juridification and new IR actors, the social partners are 
seen to take concrete steps, institutionalized in a framework under their control, to improve 
enforcement strategies and thus address the issue of internal legitimacy. At the same time, their 
ability to enforce the committee’s precedence over independent litigation reflects an increase 
in their coercive power (Simms and Charlwood, 2010). These changes enabled the social 
partners to legitimately represent their constituencies – (noncitizen) Palestinian workers and 
their employers – in keeping with efforts by unions elsewhere to broaden their constituencies 
(Mundlak 2020).  
Though in theory litigation is open to all and undermines the ‘insider’ benefits that 
unions grant to members, employees with better access to the system or superior understanding 
will benefit more from litigation and therefore the dominance of the employment rights regime 
can perpetuate existing inequalities between workers (Colvin, 2016: 19-20). Thus, Colvin 
(2016: 26) notes a ‘growing inequality in access to justice in the workplace’, even under a 
strong employment rights regime, where ‘rather than individual employment rights providing 
a universal structure of rights and fair treatment’ there is ‘great variation… in the protections 
and fairness accorded to workers’. However, in the case analyzed here it was the combination 
of a ‘rights’ logic with the institutional power of the social partners that broadened the union’s 
constituency and decreased decades-old inequality between insiders and outsiders (e.g. Benassi 
and Dorigatti, 2015). The case therefore supports the assertion that the ability of the social 
partners to promote effective representation depends at least partly on their promotion of 
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regulation that encompasses the entire sector, as well as strategically mobilizing their 
constituencies while maintaining cross-class cooperation (O’Brady, 2019). 
Thus on one hand, juridification promotes a perspective that recognizes precarious, 
non-unionized workers, advocating for noncitizens in the sector and thereby goading further 
juridification. On the other hand, while accepting the logic of juridification, the social partners 
subordinate this logic to collective frameworks. This is a kind of ‘privatization’ of dispute 
resolution in Colling’s (2004) sense, reducing the burden on state institutions, under the 
protection of collective actors. Nonetheless, while the new framework subsumes individual 
workers’ voice and grievances into collective labor relations, the social partners also kept the 
basic exclusionary principles of Israeli IR intact, eschewing bottom-up inclusive strategies such 
as organizing among the sector’s most precarious workers. Indeed, given other cases where 
workers have joined unions merely to access legal services and have left when the dispute has 
been settled (e.g. Preminger, 2018a: 143), it is unlikely that this kind of social partnership 
initiative will be effective as a recruitment strategy.  
This case has implications beyond the relationship between juridification and collective 
IR. Here we see the social partners reasserting themselves as dominant IR actors and joint 
regulators of the sectoral labor market, strengthening the position of sectoral collective 
bargaining while enabling employers to reduce their exposure to independent legal action. Put 
differently, we see how the social partners shifted the focus of regulation of the employment 
relationship from the organization to the sector, thus neutralizing ‘organizational primacy’ and 
its tendency to ‘undermine the generality of individual employment rights’ (Colvin, 2016: 23). 
Mandatory arbitration of labor disputes has been called a ‘signal example of organizational 
primacy in individual employment rights since it allows the employer to determine the process 
of enforcement through which individual rights are pursued by employees’ (Colvin, 2016: 24); 
however, in this case the social partners created a quasi-mandatory and quasi-judicial dispute 
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resolution mechanism that ensured that the logic of workplace-level individual rights 
realization was channeled through a collective, sector-level framework – thus reviving sector-
level social partnership and the institutional legacies of a robust corporatist system. 
While they fail to directly address the union’s ‘democratic deficit’ (Mundlak, 2003), 
the social partners exploit their secure status to take an active and more effective representation 
of their constituencies. This change does not reflect or lead to  major shift in the balance of 
class power in the workers’ favor; instead, it signifies cooperation between the partners to 
jointly address the particular problem of their declining salience in the labor market, making 
strategic use of the logic of juridification in countering trends of decentralization and 
liberalization of central collective labor regulation.  
Thus the case supports the ‘r combination’ thesis (Heery, 2011: 89), which suggests 
that unions are able to incorporate substantive law within collective frameworks, using it as a 
basis for bargaining and enforcement; however, the case extends this concept to emphasize the 
political basis for social partnership. So while support from state agencies for rights-based 
representation can ‘erode collective industrial relations processes’ (Currie and Teague, 2016: 
380), in this case the focus on the joint regulation of rights enhanced the legitimacy of collective 
bargaining at sectoral level. This underlines the importance of context and the position of the 
trade union within law and norms (O’Brady 2019; O’Sullivan et al., 2015): while in 
decentralized IR systems unions can be overwhelmed by litigation, due to employer strategies 
of avoiding collective frameworks (Guillaume, 2018: 239), and juridification embodies the 
‘line of conflict’ between unions and employers, in the context of Israel’s corporatist 
institutional legacies this conflict is ‘contained’ within the sphere of social partnership. Where 
the union has (historical) institutional support, employers are more likely to engage with the 
union in addressing individual disputes within collective frameworks. 
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New IR actors still played an important role in promoting workers’ rights, 
compensating for the remote and exclusionary representation by the social partners, leading 
them in turn to reform traditional collective labor relations in order to regain traditional 
primacy. However, in this broader context, these new actors are not a homogeneous category 
but rather distinguished by their ability to remain relevant in a changing IR landscape. Thus 
CSOs functioned both as a rival to the union and as an incentive for its change (Bondy, 2020b), 
while private lawyers, who also posed a threat to traditional collective bargaining, proved to 
be essential in the face of the increased salience of judicial procedures inside collective labor 
relations as well as outside this framework (see also Mundlak, 2007).  
The differences between these new IR actors are further illustrated by Michal Tadjer, 
Kav La’Oved’s former CEO: ‘What does the enforcement committee do? How many cases do 
they handle each year?... It’s a drop in the ocean!’ (Tadjer, personal communication, 2018). 
She was quick to reject the idea of her organization working with the Histadrut, noting the 
latter’s ostensible cooperation with the structural problems that perpetuated violations of labor 
standards (e.g. subcontracted employment relations, the occupation of Palestinian territories 
and the lack of workers’ political citizenship). In other words, Tadjer’s response reflects a 
recognition that the Histadrut’s cooperation with the traditional corporatist partners is liable to 
perpetuate the violations of Palestinians’ human rights. The CSO understood that the union’s 
interests are still far from its own agenda, and that the enforcement committee mainly shifted 
the balance of power in the union’s favor.  
Thus the difference between actors, their impact on social partners’ strategies and the 
structure of the social partnership, as well as their continued relevance to workers’ 
representation, are significant. The threats and challenges of new actors to the traditional, 
centralized and remote social partnership spurred its reform by making clear the importance of 
collective bargaining to employers and of inclusive representation to the union. However, the 
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response – a more inclusive and responsive partnership – diminished the prominence of CSOs 
in representing workers’ grievances. Private lawyers on the other hand continue to be relevant 
to workers’ representation, even within the new social partnership strategy. Their narrow, 
rights-based approach is seen to compensate for the ongoing deficiencies of the social partners, 




In this article, we asked how processes of juridification impact the structures and frameworks 
of collective industrial relations. Using a rich case study from the Israeli construction sector, 
we suggested that a rights-based view of the employment relationship can be complementary 
to collective interest representation; thus contributing to the debate on the displacement of 
collective bargaining by an employment rights regime (Deakin et al., 2015; O’Sullivan et al., 
2015; Piore and Safford, 2006), and showing that ‘substantive employment rights’ can be 
anchored within collective institutions. Moreover, the framework initiated by the social 
partners (the ‘enforcement committee’) constitutes a bolstering of their position within the IR 
system, re-establishing the primacy of traditional actors over alternative representation forms. 
Rooted in social partnership, the (collective) mechanism adopte  the logic of legal 
regulation and juridified representation to enhance the status of the organizations involved vis-
a-vis the state and the legal system, as well as in the eyes of their constituents. Crucially, the 
framework created to shore up the social partnership facilitated the inclusion of workers 
previously excluded from collective representation – a step that would have been unimaginable 
in the past. However, in establishing the committee, the social partners accept a legalistic 
framing of injustice, doing nothing to develop a narrative of injustice capable of reviving a 
collective framing of the employment relationship, as noted in other research into unions’ use 
of law (e.g. O’Sullivan et al., 2015). Nonetheless, this case underlines the effectiveness of 
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external pressures and demands on IR actors in goading them to act, and the potentially positive 
implications of competition between traditional social partners and the new IR actors thriving 
under a juridified ‘employment rights regime’. In the context of a union enjoying a secure 
status, the creation of a framework for safeguarding workers’ rights and enforcing collective 
agreements enabled the union t  (re)assert its relevance for workers and its control over the 
sectoral labor market.  
Moreover, while the case presented here did not increase union density or significantly 
improve wages, the agreement over enforcement is a ‘labor parity’ (Kelly, 2004: 271) 
agreement: it offers ‘concrete evidence of mutual gain’ (Danford et al., 2009: 59), for both 
employers (and their association) and the union. It suggests that union decline has not led to 
untrammeled employer power (what Wright called ‘capitalist utopia’; 2000: 987), but to 
different, judicial forms of worker protection which have their own disadvantages for 
employers – particularly decreased discretion in determining labor standards and the burden of 
legal claims. These disadvantages can make a collective approach to IR appear preferable – for 
all parties. In other words, faced with deep disorganization and juridification of IR, employers 
in the context of corporatist institutional legacies are seen to favor the revival of unions and 
coordinated social partnership, which can facilitate industrial peace and nhance employers’ 
influence over regulatory enforcement. 
While the article puts forward claims about the relations between juridification and 
collective labor relations on the basis of one case study, its conclusions are significant for future 
research. On one hand, adopting juridification can be seen as a union revitalization strategy 
(Ibsen and Tapia, 2017), enhancing union power vis-a-vis judicial frameworks. On the other 
hand, this strategy can also be seen as an attempt by EAs to enhance their relevance to 
employers, to counter trends of opting out of collective bargaining.  
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To conclude: juridification, then, has significant potential to negatively impact 
centralized IR systems and the development of inclusive collective representation structures, 
yet its logic can be compatible with social partnership. In cases of agreement between the social 
partners regarding the need to curtail the expensive and time-consuming manifestations of 
juridification, and where there is still strong institutional support for social partnership, the 
collective IR system seems capable of subsuming the logic of the employment rights regime. 
However, given the potential incompatibilities between social partnership and organizing 
strategies for union revitalization (Frege and Kelly, 2003; Preminger, 2013, 2018b), further 
research might investigate to what extent or under what circumstances a union with an 
organizing orientation is able to embrace the logic of juridification. 
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2 Cases handled by the tribunals ‘increased from 15,000 per year in the early 1970s to 186,300 in 2011-2012’ 
(Guillaume, 2016: 231).  From 2012, the UK took steps to reduce these numbers, including by introducing fees 
in 2013, leading to a drop of 79% in the subsequent three months. The fees were abolished in 2017 after the 
Supreme Court ruled them unlawful and unconstitutional, leading to a ‘sharp increase in the number of 
individual claims’ (Guillaume, 2016: 232).  
3 Histadrut: the General Federation of Labour in Israel (see Shalev, 1992 and Preminger, 2018a for overviews of 
Israeli IR). 
4 The entry of noncitizen Palestinians into the Israeli labor force began soon after the Six-Day War of 1967, which 
left extensive Palestinian territories under Israeli control. 
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